America’s Asia Pivot Threatens Regional Stability

Washington, we are told, is now “pivoting” its energy, resources and attention from the Middle East and Europe to Asia, reflecting a recognition of the increasingly vital importance of that region for future American wealth, security and global influence. Unfortunately, the execution of this shift, and China’s response, are combining to deepen mutual suspicions and potentially destabilize the entire area, ending the decade-long stability in Sino-American relations that resulted from a U.S. foreign-policy shift after 9/11.

At that time, Washington moved decisively away from viewing China ominously as a rising “strategic competitor” (to quote George W. Bush) and toward significant levels of Sino-U.S. cooperation in combating terrorism and dealing with a growing array of common problems, from climate change to global economic instability. This shift brought Washington’s approach back into line with an earlier, long-standing U.S. policy of fostering greater Sino-American engagement while conducting low-key military hedging against the possibility of a future hostile China.

With President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s recent trips to the South and Western Pacific, expanding U.S. involvement in multilateral economic and security-related fora, and a strengthening of Washington’s traditional military alliances, the United States is now signaling an intention to move back toward the pre-9/11 strategic focus on a rising China. That focus places a premium on explicitly balancing against and constraining Chinese power and influence across the region.

These moves are reportedly driven by a need to counter increasing regional anxieties over China’s recently assertive behavior regarding several maritime territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries and Japan and a growing perception of an America in decline and disarray.

While a clear and reassuring reaffirmation of Washington’s commitment to Asia is certainly needed, it is not producing the desired effect. Despite all the reassuring talk emanating from President Obama during his recent trip to the region about welcoming China as a rising power, and despite repeated expressions of the U.S. intention to remain neutral in Beijing’s disputes with other powers, Secretary Clinton and other senior U.S. officials have been sending a very different message since at least the middle of 2010. Most notably, their words and deeds are creating the impression in some Asian capitals that Washington is now supporting Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan in their increasingly acrimonious disputes with Beijing over maritime territories.

For its part, Beijing is acting—and reacting—in a confusing and at times belligerent manner. Tensions over its growing military presence in maritime Asia are deepening as China fails to exert adequate control over the behavior of its ships in nearby seas and acquiesces in (or perhaps even encourages) the nonsensical conspiracy theories being spewed out domestically by hypernationalist critics of the United States.

Diplomatically, China’s leaders gyrate between voicing completely unpersuasive statements about the nonthreatening nature of its military activities and demanding, through words and actions, that others accept its absolutist (and in some cases unclear) positions on a variety of highly contentious territorial issues. All the while, Beijing signals, with increasing energy and directness, that the region needs to move away from a U.S.-centered, bilateral-alliance-based security structure.

America’s leaders apparently think that the only way to manage this increasingly complex and challenging situation is to apply a more robust and strident version of that security structure, albeit with a nod toward what it has until very recently viewed as multilateral “talk-shops” and a continued stress on negotiation over confrontation in its bilateral interactions with Beijing.

Moreover, U.S. officials seem confident that Washington can maintain indefinitely the two factors required for the ultimate success of this effort: a predominant level of military power and presence—right up to China’s maritime borders—and its past level of political and economic leadership. Unfortunately, the Chinese do not support this approach, while others in and out of the region question whether America can sustain its leadership and predominance. Some even question the wisdom of attempting to maintain such a defense of the status quo in the face of a growing regional and global diffusion of power.

Washington must rethink its basic assumptions about its role in the region. First, it should initiate serious discussions, internally and among friends in the region, about how best to reassure its allies and the Chinese that it is not pursuing a zero-sum approach in Asia. As a central part of this reassessment, it should reexamine how best to address and when to accommodate China’s most critical security concerns, especially along its maritime borders.

More broadly, the United States should develop a long-term strategy for gradually leading the region toward a more multipolar security environment and away from a heavy reliance on American naval superiority and a bilateral alliance system that is increasingly out of touch with regional and global realities.

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/washington-destabilizes-sino-american-relations-6211?page=1

4 thoughts on “America’s Asia Pivot Threatens Regional Stability

  • Marisa Sung

    Very interesting man!! Great discovery on his blog! Josh would be a very exciting interview to read about!

    Here’s what he posted so far:

    Understanding Kim Jong Il from a systems perspective, and what to do now Posted on December 20, 2011 by Joshua Reading the spate of articles on Kim Jong Il and North Korea, I’ve seen what look from my perspective misinterpretations.

    Reporters repeatedly succumb to ascribing to the leader what I consider properties of the system. I think they adopt a great-man model that says if something is working, someone must be making it happen. With only Kim Jong Il or Kim Il Sung around, it must be them.

    Misallocating causes to events leads to ineffective or counterproductive strategies to act on them.

    I’ll illustrate with two New Yorker articles, not because they misallocate most, but because they do least. In an otherwise excellent article, Evan Osnos wrote, commenting on Vaclav Havel’s observation that totalitarian lies must be universal,

    Nobody has engineered the apparatus of universal fiction more effectively, and catastrophically, than the Kim dynasty, which maintained control of a nation that still manufactures transistor radios built to receive only a single station. Where Mao and Stalin succumbed to the sheer scale of their undertakings, Kim Jong-il, and his father, Kim Il-sung, before him, addressed a more manageable canvas and “created one giant Potemkin village,”

    He credits mostly the Kims for what I believe the “more manageable canvas” deserves. I believe the Kims, Mao, and Stalin all used the same techniques. Only the Kims’ isolated canvas allowed them to make their story universal in their domain. Russia and China border too many countries to seal off, as North Korea can.

    He continues, that Kim Jong Il, during the collapse of the Soviet Union and periods of flooding and economic collapse,

    was thrust through a series of military and Party promotions at the very moment that the system, by all rights, should have been collapsing. … Kim and his father maintained power, in part, by the force of their own mythology, and by keeping their people on a war footing for more than half a century.

    I wrote before how factors unrelated to stability and loyalty won’t change the North Korean system of power. The Soviet Union collapse, flooding, and economic collapse didn’t affect stability and loyalty so, despite their size, those factors didn’t change the system.

    In other words, the Kims didn’t maintain the system. It maintained them. Once the Soviets created the North Korea system in 1945, it had the durability to maintain itself under a wide set of circumstances.

    Like many reporters, he characterizes Kim Jong Il as defiant as a person. Since his role required it, I don’t attribute him as much.

    Kim was, by turns, a practitioner of terrorism and canny diplomacy. … In his final year, he showed little sign of retreat, as his forces sank a South Korean vessel, revealed a new uranium-enrichment program, and shelled the island of Yeonpyeong.

    By my read he wasn’t canny. His system required shows of force like that to make the missile threat on Seoul credible. I expect all the decision-makers felt not attacking South Korea periodically risked their own lives, which I’m sure they values more than those of a few sailors.

    All of the above interpretation would just amount to different opinions if it didn’t diverge in what to do next. He closes with a call to action, however modest.

    America has a different kind of power at its disposal than China does: “The United States has the option to reach out early to the new leadership group. Where is the harm in that—versus keeping them isolated, at arm’s length, and allowing China to remain their only portal to the world? This is a moment for President Obama to reach out a hand.”

    I agree the President of the United States reaching out a hand won’t hurt and I could imagine it helping, despite no President having changed anything systemic before.

    But the more effective source of change, in my opinion, requires systemic change, which diplomacy hasn’t created. I believe a more effective call to action would be to motivate creating ties across the border to increase information flow — for example through tourism, sport, education, arts, culture, and even bootleg dvds.

    I’d like to repeat I consider the New Yorker’s coverage excellent. I’m focusing on one point.

    SOURCE:
    http://joshuaspodek.com/understanding-kim-jong-il-systems-perspective

    Reply
  • jaymie

    Josh – what do you think about the passing of Kim Jong-Il?

    Reply
  • Oh, I didn’t notice these comments until Nancy’s showed up. I was working on the book.

    Jaymie, I hope Marisa’s post answered your question in part. Later posts will comment more on his passing, sorry for the delay.

    Reply
  • nancylee

    and he’s back! The American in North Korea!

    Reply

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